New Perspectives on the Evaluation of Public R&D Funding by Marianna, Marino et al.
New Perspectives on the Evaluation of Public
R&D Funding
Marianna Marino￿ Pierpaolo Parrotta∗ Davide Sala∗∗
December 2010
Abstract
Any economic criteria for an eﬃcient allocation of resources is based on
marginal “thinking”. Such criteria can equally be applied to the evaluation
of the public allocation of R&D funds. Diﬀerently from the usual evaluation
schemes - mainly dichotomous - this study implements the continuous treat-
ment matching approach to investigate the optimality of the modulation of
public funding. With this method, the marginal treatment eﬀects can be
identified and sub-optimal amounts of public funding determined. Although
we can distinguish cases of input additionality, the substitutability outcome
seems to prevail also when unobserved heterogeneity is accounted for.
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1 Introduction
The positive relationship between R&D investment and economic growth is well
rooted in economic theory and, on this nexus, policies fostering private R&D in-
vestments are regarded as growth-conducive and therefore as desirable from a social
point of view.
But it is also on a mere eﬃcient ground that these policies are viewed as nec-
essary in a market economy. The incomplete appropriation of the returns to R&D
that arises - a form of negative externality - inevitably leads to a deficient level
of R&D investment - a market failure. The role of public policy is then to propel
private R&D investment to a social optimal level.
This role could not be more apparent than in the recent economic crisis. As
noted by the OECD (2009), many governments have adopted a number of measures
aiming at supporting firms’ innovation. These measures reflect the conviction of
policy makers that an adequate level of innovation is not only crucial to business
success, but it is also a decisive factor to recover from the downturn.
Yet - even if governments allocate public resources in favor of those projects
that would not have been realized in absence of public support (crowding-in), it
is plausible that eligible firms simply substitute R&D investments they originally
planned to undertake with the public financial resources made available (crowding-
out), undermining the argument for “additional” eﬀects of public aid.1 In our sam-
ple, for instance, firms which receive the largest subsidies are also those exhibiting
a significant dependence on public financing, with the public grant amounting to
almost half of the private R&D expenditure. And, interestingly, firms showing the
highest R&D intensity have the least dependency on public support.2
To strike a balance between “crowding-in” eﬀects and “crowding-out” eﬀects
that typically plague such public policies, policy makers are assigned the task of
1 For the use of this terminology - “crowding-in” - see Diamond (1999), p. 424 .
2 R&D intensity is defined as the ratio of R&D expenditure to sales.
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the modulation of public intervention. Therefore, an overall assessment of public
grant support to R&D activities should evaluate not only the advisability of public
support, but also its modulation, an equally important aspect, yet under-studied
in this literature.3 The aim of our analysis is precisely to make a step toward this
ultimate goal, proposing to investigate the modulation of public support by means
of the continuous treatment evaluation scheme.
The employment of such an econometric technique, together with the categor-
ical treatment evaluation scheme, allows us to introduce new perspectives on the
evaluation of public R&D subsidies, not least the part of the distribution of the
public subsidy to R&D where “crowding-in” or “crowding-out” eﬀects are likely to
emerge as well as the marginal eﬀect of benefiting from larger sums for the recipient
firms. To investigate the implications of the modulation of public support along
diﬀerent dimensions, we divide recipient firms into a number of groups defined in
terms of the percentile of the public support received.
First, we simply consider how diﬀerent amounts of R&D grants impact on the
advisability of public support. In fact, it is reasonable that a significant positive
overall ATT is just an algebraic sum of positive and negative (often even negligi-
ble) eﬀects of diﬀerent modulations of treatment. By comparing R&D outcomes
between similar funded and not funded firms within each group, we can establish
which groups of funded firms are mainly contributing to the aggregate growth of
R&D investment in the economy.
Second, we study the adequacy of the allocation of subsidies to firms’ R&D ac-
tivities. Employing a categorical treatment evaluation scheme we compare publicly
financed firms with similar characteristics across diﬀerent groups. The policy rele-
vance of these comparisons is hard to question, as it is needed to determine whether
firms benefiting from the largest amounts of public funding are also investing (in
research) similarly to less supported firms. In this case, public authorities can im-
prove their policy target through funds re-allocation among recipients. We do not
3 See Blundell and Costa Dias (2000) and Aerts and Schmidt (2008).
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confine this type of our analysis to the short run, but, for the first time, we attempt
to extend it to the medium-run horizon to accommodate sensible lag eﬀects of such
public policies.
Finally, we turn to the question of determining the proper modulation of R&D
public financing. By means of the continuous treatment matching evaluation
scheme, we can evaluate for every treated firm the causal eﬀect of further in-
creasing the public grant on a firm’s R&D outcome, as this method can identify
the marginal eﬀects of subsidies and their optimal amounts. The amount at which
the public support ceases to be beneficial can therefore be determined. The prac-
tical relevance of such an analysis is the possibility to scrutinize whether returns
to public R&D support are aligned to the governmental target.
Our findings corroborate the view that both “crowding-in” and “crowding-
out” eﬀects can coexist depending on the modulation of the public support. In
particular, “crowding-out” eﬀects prevail - as to be expected - for grants higher
than DKK 9 million (corresponding to 23% of the financed firms).
The recent work by Go¨rg and Strobl (2007) is - in our opinion - closest related
to ours, implementing first the categorical matching, but neglecting - what is our
salient contribution - the continuous treatment approach in evaluating such policies
and the medium-run eﬀects of these policies.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses
the state of the art in the evaluation of public R&D grants. Section 3 introduces
briefly the methodology employed in this paper, section 4 describes the data, and
section 5 presents and discusses our findings. Section 6 concludes.
2 Empirical Review
The empirical literature concerned with the evaluation of R&D policies has typ-
ically relied on the notion of additionality as an indicator of policy eﬀectiveness.
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The concept of “additionality” was introduced by Buisseret et al. (1995) and
indicates the diﬀerence made by the state interference in the market play. The
argument can be summarized as follows: economic theory and empirical findings
robustly support the positive relationship linking R&D investment and economic
growth. Then, assuming that public aid for technological developments induces
private firms to undertake “additional” R&D investments (i.e. firms that would
have not undertaken those R&D investments without public support), it is possible
to infer that the policy intervention leads to economic growth and social welfare.
To address the inquiry of “additionality”, evaluations of public financing pro-
grams typically present casual analyses based on counterfactuals, what would have
occurred in absence of intervention. At the heart of this analysis is the recognition
that neither firms which have received support nor firms which have not applied
for funds can be considered random events. On the contrary, firms’ behavior is the
explicit consequence of the policy design, as firms are often aware of those criteria
on the basis of which governmental authorities will decide funds allocation (i.e.
self-selection).
In this respect, our study is no exception and follows this strand of literature,
assessing the Danish R&D grant support system performing an “after the fact”
analysis.
It is undeniable that a plethora of studies implementing diﬀerent approaches
and overcoming database limitations in diﬀerent ways has generated a vast mixed
evidence, ranging from being in favor of “crowding-in” eﬀects (Go¨rg and Strobl,
2007; Aerts and Schmidt, 2008; Hussinger, 2008) to being unable to reject “crowding-
out” eﬀects (Lach, 2002; Heijs and Herrera, 2004).4 Our study contributes to this
literature proposing to assess the “additionality” question with yet another method
within counterfactual analyis, namely the continuous treatment scheme. We ar-
4 See also David et al. (2000), Garcia-Quevedo (2004), Aerts and Czarnitzki (2004, 2006), Almus
and Czarnitzki (2003), Czarnitzki and Fier (2001), Duguet (2004), Gonzalez et. al (2005), Gon-
zalez and Pazo (2008), Lo¨o¨f and Heshmati (2005), Busom (2000), Suetens (2002), and Wallsten
(2000).
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gue that this method, when implemented together with the categorical treatment
scheme introduced by Go¨rg and Strobl (2007), permits a sound assessment of a
country R&D policy.
Finally, using Danish data, we are able to complement and extend existing
analyses (Sørensen et. al., 2003; Kaiser, 2004; Bloch and Graversen, 2008) with a
reacher data set.
3 Methodology
In this section, we briefly present the estimation methods implemented in our
empirical assessment of public R&D funding policies.
Recent advances in the program evaluation analysis have regarded the overcom-
ing of the notion of dichotomous treatment. Specifically, categorical and continuous
treatment schemes have been proposed as promising alternatives to the traditional
binary approach.5 Because of their inclination to reduce biases arising from non-
random assignments, these methods have been widely applied in empirical research
about causal inference in observational studies. To provide some insights into the
methodology as well as to discuss the strengths and the weaknesses of each method,
we discuss them separately.
3.1 Continuous Treatment Matching
Although relevant enhancements have been carried out in the policy evaluation
methods, to our knowledge the present work is the first study applying the contin-
uous treatment matching in the literature on public R&D funding. Its implementa-
tion allows us to compare enterprises exposed to a specific level of public financing
with “matched” less and more exposed ones, and then to identify marginal eﬀects
on firms’ private R&D investment.
5 Lechner (2001, 2004), Hirano and Imbens (2004).
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The continuous treatment approach appears extremely useful when the number
of treatment values is relatively large. In fact, by smoothing across treatment levels
it is possible to improve the precision of the inferences (Imbens and Wooldridge,
2009). The key assumption behind this estimation strategy is the so-called weak
unconfoundedness, introduced by Imbens (2000). Diﬀerently from the conditional
independence assumption (CIA) made by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) in the
binary case, here only the pairwise independence of the treatment with each (not
joint) of the potential outcomes is required. Thus, the problems of bias removal and
drawing causal inferences can be solved by adjusting for pre-treatment diﬀerences.
In this setting, the computation of the conditional probability of receiving a specific
level of treatment (not just receiving it) given the pre-treatment observables is
called general propensity score (GPS). Since the weak unconfoundedness given all
pre-treatment variables implies weak unconfoundedness given the GPS, the average
treatment eﬀects can be obtained by conditioning just on the GPS (Hirano and
Imbens, 2004).
More formally, we define (a) a vector of pre-treatment characteristics Xi,t−1 for
each firm i, (b) a set of continuously distributed treatment values Di,t and (c) the
dose-response function Fi,t(d)d￿D. Moreover, we assume Xi,t−1, Di,t and Fi,t(d)d￿D
having common probability space. For the sake of simplicity, the subscripts will no
longer be reported. Thus, the propensity to obtain the R&D subsidy is defined as
the conditional density of the treatment given the covariates r(d, x) = fD|X(d|x),
and the GPS is R = r(D,X) , with the function r defined up to almost everywhere
equivalence.
Furthermore, the GPS is required to respect the following balancing property
condition
X ⊥ 1(D = d)|r(d, x) ,
where 1(·) is the indicator function.
As explained in details by Bia and Mattei (2008), the implementation of the
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GPS matching method mainly consists of three steps. In the first one, the score R
is estimated and the treatment D (or a monotone transformation of it), given the
covariates, is required to respect a normal distribution:
g(D)|X ≈ N ￿(γ, X),σ2￿ .
Here, g(D) is a suitable transformation of the treatment variable and (γ, X) is
a function of covariates with linear and higher-order terms, which depends on a
vector of parameters γ. In the second step, the conditional expectation of the
outcome variable Y , given D and R, is modelled as follows:
E(Y |D,R) = a0 + a1D + a2D2 + a3D3 + a4R + a5R2 + a6R3 + a7DR ,
where the power of the arguments can be even higher than 3 and parameters are
estimated by OLS. This procedure is useful to exclude that the explicative variables
induce any bias while no direct meaning is attributed to their relative coeﬃcients.
Finally, the third step consists of averaging the estimated dose-response function
E(Yˆ ) over the estimated score function Rˆ evaluated at the desired level of treat-
ment.
Although the longitudinal dimension of our unbalanced panel is quite short,
it partially allows us to combine the GPS matching with DiD approach in order
to make the unconfoundedness assumption less restrictive (Heckman et al., 1998).
The basic idea is that, even if the unconfoundedness does not hold, it may be
reasonable to assume that the evaluation bias is constant over time (or at least it
is the same for a date before and after the treatment occurs). Thus, we evaluate
the eﬀect of the treatment on the change in the outcome variables rather than on
its level, so correcting for time-invariant firm characteristics.
A general drawback of our matching analysis has roots in the almost impossible
exact identification of the decision rule adopted by public authorities. Therefore,
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the typical omitted variable issue arises since we may miss variables (in our data set)
that the public actor uses for the attribution of the subsidies. However, the richness
of our data set allows us to include several key factors used in the evaluation process
of grants, definitively a longer list than typically included in earlier studies.
3.2 Categorical Treatment Matching
It is tautological that the final private R&D spending will depend on the amount
of the public subsidy received by a firm. But coupling the information on the
R&D grant receipt by a firm with the information on the amount received opens
the prospective of an analysis based on the categorical treatment matching. Mim-
icking the dichotomous propensity score matching, the categorical one evaluates
the expected class of treatment a firm may receive given the pre-treatment vari-
ables. Consistent with the rationale of the continuous treatment matching, the
estimation of the public intervention impact is based on the comparison of firms
with similar scores, but belonging to two diﬀerent classes or categories. These are
defined in the present paper by looking at the terciles of the public funding dis-
tribution. It surely represents an objective rule and therefore it is not subject to
fully arbitrary and potentially misleading categorization criteria. This estimation
method is well suited for comparisons not only between two consecutive categories
of treated groups, but also between treated and untreated (which is not allowed
in the continuous treatment case) groups. It helps a lot in understanding whether
a given eﬀect obtained from the single-treatment framework is simply driven by
a single category of treated or it is concretely confirmed for all categories (the
homogeneity of treatment in the last case may be more acceptable).
Thus, we have the outcomes
￿
Y 0, Y 1, .., Y M
￿
of M + 1 diﬀerent mutually ex-
clusive treatment categories (the 0-category is exclusively composed of untreated).
Obviously, we can observe only a realization of the potential outcome vector, the
remaining M are counterfactuals. In order to estimate the diﬀerent treatment ef-
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fects, the unconfoundedness and common support assumptions have to be satisfied.
Given the covariates, whereas the unconfoundedness requires the treatment indi-
cator to be independent of the realized outcomes, the common support ensures to
find a counterpart in the comparison group, which is addressed by the computation
of the propensity score. In this regard, a practical suggestion is that the existence
of diﬀerently treated units can be ignored in a given pairwise category comparison
since they are not needed for identification.
For the implementation of the categorical matching, it is needed to run as
many probit estimations as the number of eﬀects we are interested in. So, once
identified the probability of receiving a given subsidy size compared with the next
larger one, conditional on the set of pre-treatment covariates, it is possible to
compute the associated treatment eﬀect. Counterfactuals are selected by using the
caliper method (set at 0.01). That represents a scalar defining the boundary of
the neighborhood in which matching is allowed. In this way, we seek to ensure
the quality of matching, since “bad” matches are prevented to be included in
comparison groups.
Analogously to the continuous treatment matching, to control for time-invariant
firm-specific characteristics, it is appropriate to combine the multi-valued discrete
matching with the DiD technique. Hence, the outcome variable which is the log
private R&D expenditure will also be taken in first diﬀerences. Consequently, each
treatment eﬀect is nothing else than the diﬀerence in diﬀerences of the outcome
variable: the pure treatment eﬀect when time-varying factors (observed and unob-
served) are balanced over categories.6
6 Of course, we cannot completely rule out that there exist (firm-specific) time-varying unobserv-
ables aﬀecting the receipt of public funding and private expenditure in research.
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4 Data and Variables
Data for our empirical analysis are collected from four diﬀerent data sources, three
of them provided by Statistics Denmark. The first database is the Danish R&D
Statistics, a survey conducted biennially from 1997 to 2005 by the Danish Centre
for Studies in Research and Research Policy. Although this survey presents a
longitudinal dimension (1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005), only a subsample of firms
is recorded over the entire time span. To use lagged values in the computation
of the simple and general propensity score in our analysis, we retain only firms
that are in the survey at least for two consecutive periods. Additionally, extremes
values (i.e. 1st and 99th percentile of the distribution) in terms of private R&D
intensity or received public R&D funds have been excluded to avoid pervasive
influences of outliers.7 From this survey we are interested in these variables: the
amount of public funding, the private R&D expenditure and the presence of a R&D
department within the firm.
The second data source is the “Integrated Database for Labor Market Research”
(IDA). IDA is a longitudinal employer-employee database in which detailed infor-
mation on individuals employed in the Danish firms is recorded every year on the
30th of November. From IDA it is possible to compute the firm’s share of workers
with vocational education and of employees with tertiary education. We proceed to
classify firms into 18 industries and determine whether a firm has been established
only within the three most recent years (dummy for entrepreneurship, “newentr”).8
The third data-source we use is an accounting database from a Danish credit
rating agency - “Købmandstandens Oplysningsbureau” (KØB) - containing infor-
mation on firms’ sales, value added, exports, total assets, and indebtedness.
7 See also Wagner (2008).
8 The industry classification is at the two-digit level. The diﬀerent industries are business ser-
vices, chemical products, construction, financial services, food - beverages and tobacco, hotels &
restaurants, leather products, machinery & equipments, metal products, mineral products, paper
products and petroleum products, plastic products, R&D services, textile products, transports,
wholesale trade, wood products.
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The last source has been provided by the Centre for Economic and Business
Research (CEBR). It consists of a data set on patent applications and grants
ascribed to Danish firms at the EPO in the period 1978-2003. From this data source
we retrieve information on co-patents in order to proxy the firms’ involvement
in cooperation or other forms of collaboration with other economic actors. Co-
patenting behavior - as captured by a co-patent dummy - is often related to the
firm’s ability to exploit external knowledge and generate beneficial spillovers as
well. It would have been ideal to include the number of patent applications among
the matching variables, but unfortunately that induces severe collinearity problems
with the co-patent dummy variable.
Obviously, the treatment variable is the amount of the R&D subsidy received
from the government or other public institutions.
The matching is defined on the basis of the following pre-treatment variables:
log of total assets scaled to value added, indebtedness (log of loans), exports scaled
to sales, R&D intensity indicator (private R&D expenditure over sales), a measure
of public funding dependence (the ratio of public funds received to private R&D
expenditure), shares of highly skilled employees and vocational workers, dummies
for co-patent, size, industry and year.
Several among these covariates typically appear also in the related literature.
The dummies account for potential macroeconomic fluctuations (business cycle
eﬀects), common demand or supply shocks or idiosyncratic shocks to a given com-
pany size or a given industry, while the other pre-treatment variables capture
firm-specific and observable heterogeneity.
In this prospective, and a novelty in this literature, is the inclusion in the se-
lection equation of the public funding dependence, to account for limited private
resources that may constraint firms’ private R&D initiative.9 To account specif-
ically for credit constraints, easy to envisage considered the relevant sunk costs
9 Previous studies have typically used a dummy variable informing on whether the firm received
the treatment or not.
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associated to R&D activity, we also include indebtedness. Equally important, we
add the dummy variable for entrepreneurship to our selection equation as innova-
tive entrepreneurship and business potentials are key factors openly accounted by
Danish authorities in the assignation of public R&D funding.
The ratio of firms’ total assets over value added proxies for capital intensity:
if the policy maker is more keen to favor support of labor-intensive production
(employment promoting policies), capital-intensive firms may result disadvantaged
vis-a`-vis labor-intensive firms, so that a high capital intensity may be negatively
associated with the propensity to be supported.
The inclusion of the shares of workers’ categories is informative on the com-
position of the firm’s workforce and accounts for the human capital embedded in
the production process. The presence of an in-house R&D department is used in
combination with the labor force composition to proxy firms’ ability to properly
exploit internal and external knowledge sources (absorptive capacity). Our aim is
again to control for the creation of an internal and/or external center of knowledge
and the promotion of workers’ skills and competencies which are among the core
factors for the allocation of public R&D funding. In this respect, the exports sales
ratio might reveal a propensity by a policy maker to fund companies more active in
international markets and characterized by higher productivity levels with larger
potential for innovations.10 Size dummies are defined as follows: firms with less
than 20 employees, between 20 and 49, between 50 and 99, and equal or larger than
a hundred. This classification finds justification in the Danish industrial structure,
dominated by small and medium firms (enterprises with less than 50 employees
account for more than 95% of the total firm population, e.g. OECD 2005).
Overall our strategy emerges clearly: each variable in the selection equation
expresses our attempt to account at the best of our knowledge for the criteria that
Danish public authorities declare to use for the targeting of their subsidies. Namely,
cooperation, skill development, internationalization, entrepreneurship, high-tech
10Bernard and Jensen (1999) and Melitz (2003) among others.
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projects, good business plans and performance.
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 describes the main variables used in the analysis, favoring the compar-
isons across the four categories of firms. The first two variables listed are the two
outcome variables (the dependent variables of our analysis); the other variables
are all used in the selection equation and determine the matching between control
and treated groups. Funded firms are divided into three groups (Cat 1, Cat 2 and
Cat 3) corresponding to the first, second and third tercile of the public subsidy
distribution respectively.11 Cat 0 is the residual category including firms that were
never granted public R&D support, but nevertheless are performing R&D. Cat 0
is by far the largest group of firms. It counts 12, 566 companies, while each tercile
contains 147 funded enterprises. The number of observations shrinks notably when
we account only for financed firms. This data limitation is ascribable to the design
of the R&D survey characterized by a poor overlap of firms between-waves.
Both the average of private R&D expenditure and the level of indebtedness
(reported in log of million DKK) are increasing along the defined categories. As
expected, the share of larger firms also enlarges from the bottom to the top quar-
tile. However, these patterns are not common for all other variables considered,
which show non-monotonic relations between categories. For instance, the other
dependent variable - the average private R&D growth - peaks in Cat 2, while it is
on a quite low level in Cat 0.
Similarly, the share of new entrant firms is more similar between Cat 0 and Cat
3, but it grows from the first to the second category. The lowest average level of
capital intensity is recorded for firms in Cat 0, while the highest is recorded for the
least funded ones. The non-financed firms also show the lowest export intensity,
but - on average - this variable is decreasing in accordance with the amount of
11Companies belonging to Cat 1 receive between DKK 0, 003 and 0, 265 million, those in Cat 2
between DKK 0, 265 and 1, 350 million and those in Cat 3 from DKK 1, 350 to 208, 391 million.
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public funding provided.
It is worth noting that firms in Cat 2 show higher value in R&D intensity than
firms in Cat 3, but nevertheless they are both considerably larger than those re-
ported for the least and not funded categories. The most financed firms also exhibit
a stronger dependence on public subsidies: on average the public support is almost
half of the private R&D expenditure for Cat 3. However, such a group of firms
largely dominates all other categories for fruitful cooperation or collaboration in
research activities (proxied by co-patenting behavior) with other economic actors.
Nevertheless, it appears extremely interesting that the category with higher R&D
intensity (Cat 2) also presents the lowest dependence on public support among the
categories of financed companies.
Every surveyed funded firm declares the presence of an internal R&D depart-
ment, whereas only 23% of not financed businesses perform in-house R&D activi-
ties. That motivates the inclusion of this dummy in our analysis, which together
with the labor force composition allows us to compare (financed with not financed)
firms that presumably detain similar abilities to internalize knowledge and conse-
quently turn it into innovations. Finally, the dummy indicating firms’ partial or
total foreign ownership does not turn out to be particularly informative: only the
0.1% of the untreated firms shows such a characteristic. However, its inclusion is
useful to exclude foreign-owned firms from the sample, preventing eventual bias po-
tentially induced by unobservables related to the legal status. A similar argument
applies to five industries that are not represented in at least one category: financial
sector, hotels & restaurants; paper products; petroleum products; transports.
It is plausible that these stylized facts partially reflect the targeting defined
by public authorities (mentioned above), but the degree of dependence on public
subsidies raises reasonable concerns about the optimality of the allocation and the
social returns of R&D funds.
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5 Results
This section presents the results based on our categorical and continuous matching
evaluation. In the first approach, we divide financed firms into three categories
reflecting the terciles of the distribution of the R&D support grant. This choice
is clearly data-driven since it is not grounded on any a priori knowledge about
optimal amount thresholds. Although the decision of partitioning the entire R&D
subsidy distribution in three equally populated groups is to some extent arbitrary,
it appears to us as the most sensible option given the size of our sample. In fact, one
trades oﬀ the number of groups analyzed with the number of observation available
in each group. If the number of available observations is not suﬃcient, not only
estimates lose eﬃciency, but the estimation method also becomes unfeasible due to
the lack of a common support. This limit does not aﬀect the continuous matching
method similarly, which approximates the distribution of public funds according
to a normal density function.
We then turn to the medium-run evaluation and robustness checks.
5.1 Main Results
Table 2 summarizes the estimations obtained with the categorical matching method
for our two outcome variables, namely the log-level of private R&D spending and
the log diﬀerence of private R&D spending (i.e. growth rate of private R&D
spending). While the first variable eases the interpretation of our treatment eﬀect,
the latter better accounts for unobserved heterogeneity and therefore constitutes
our benchmark when we evaluate the significance of our eﬀects.
The first row of Table 2 refers to the standard dichotomous matching method
in which all categories of publicly financed firms (Cat 1, Cat 2 and Cat 3) are
compared with untreated ones (Cat 0). This simple comparison shows a quite
large positive and significant eﬀect of public funds provision: on average the set
of financed firms invests about 65% more than not financed ones. However, scru-
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tinizing the pairs of diﬀerently funded versus unfunded companies, this result is
not confirmed for the first tercile (Cat 1). In this case, the treatment eﬀect is
positive but insignificant. The interpretation of the results is unchanged if we con-
sider the growth in private R&D expenditure: treated firms exceed of nearly 28%
untreated ones and again Cat 1 does not significantly diﬀer from Cat 0. Similarly
for the comparison between Cat 3 and Cat 0 or Cat 1 when the private R&D
growth is considered as outcome variable. However, the last two terciles of the
treated firms show significantly positive eﬀects with respect to the untreated or
least treated firms for the log level of private R&D spending. Interestingly, when
we only compare treated firms, we find that firms belonging to Cat 3 do not present
any significant additionality eﬀect with respect to those in Cat 2. Overall, Cat 2 is
the only category that seems to show consistent additionality eﬀects for both out-
come variables, indicating that companies receiving the largest doses of treatment
might substitute private R&D with public subsidies.
In line with this argument, we deepen our analysis to investigate the role that
diﬀerent amounts of public subsidy may have in determining a crowding- out eﬀect
of public R&D support.
Table 4 shows results from the continuous treatment matching evaluation. For
a large number of treatment doses over the subsidy distribution, the marginal
eﬀects of R&D spending on the outcome variable are computed for a 1% variation
in the amount of public subsidy received. For instance, a firm currently receiving
approximately DKK 8.2 million subsidy would increase both its log level private
R&D expenditure and its growth rate of private R&D of 0.2%, had the subsidy
received increased of 1%.12 The change at this threshold level (i.e, DKK 8.2 million)
is statistically significant only for the outcome variable in first diﬀerence, while the
threshold level for the outcome variable in levels is slightly superior (i.e. DKK 18.2
12Made 100 the initial level of R&D spending, the percentage increase in the level of spending
corresponds in absolute terms rather than in log scale to an increase of 100(0.0024)− 1 = 0, 0111
or 1.11%.
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million). Overall, these results confirm the hypothesis of crowding-out between
private expenditure and public financing for a considerably high level of treatment
doses, and these negative treatment eﬀects strengthen with the increase of the
dose.
Finally, it is opportune to complement these results from the intra-tercile eval-
uation (i.e., continuous treatment evaluation) with those from the inter-tercile
comparisons (i.e. categorical treatment evaluation). It emerges that crowding-in
eﬀects occur for several doses of treatment, mainly in the second tercile and in the
last part of the first tercile, if the outcome variable is taken in log-levels. Although
somewhat more restricted in the range, these findings are confirmed also for the
rate of private R&D spending growth. Since diﬀerences in growth rates better ac-
count for firm-specific time-invariant eﬀects, we are more confident in evaluations
having such an outcome variable.
5.2 Robustness Checks
The sensitivity analysis corroborates our main findings. Specifically, increasing the
treatment doses from 1% to 5 and 10%, we find stronger substitution eﬀects: Table
5 clearly shows that increases of 5 or 10% lead to significant crowding-out eﬀects
for amounts already above DKK 4.5 million, as compared to the DKK 8, 2 million
threshold arising with a 1% increase in the treatment dose. Therefore the firms are
mainly in the highest tercile of the public funding distribution that tends to sub-
stitute between private and public funding. Moreover, the crowding-out behavior
seems non-linear in the increase in the publicly provided funds: the substitution
eﬀect between private and public spending increases more than proportionally to
the increase in the the funding received.
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5.3 Medium-run Eﬀects
Among the novelties of our study is the combination of a short-run analysis with
a medium-run one. It is, in fact, sensible that crowding-out eﬀects may not sub-
stantiate immediately after the treatment, but they rather spread over a number
of years. To investigate this issue, we draw on the categorical matching evaluation
again. Specifically, we partition again the firms into three categories based on the
average subsidy received over the sample period. Clearly, the latter constitutes the
average dose treatment and includes also amounts equal to zero. The non-treated
are necessarily those firms that have never received funding. Both outcome vari-
ables are evaluated at the end of the sample period, while the variables in the
selection equations - upon which firms will be merged - are evaluated at the be-
ginning of our sample period, namely 1997. That is, like a one-period analysis
where the treatment is just calculated as the average of the treatments over the
entire sample span, the outcome is taken in the last period of the sample and the
pre-selection variables are the values in the first period of the sample. A 8-year
window between the matching and the final treatment status being a rather long
period of time, the causality nature of the analysis weakens; our results should
then be cautiously interpreted as causal eﬀects.
Table 3 presents our results. The standard dichotomous matching shows no
significant ATTs. On the contrary, as far as the growth of private R&D expenditure
is concerned, public funding to R&D seems to promote private R&D expenditure
for the last tercile of treated compared to the untreated and Cat 1. However, we do
not find any evidence that such a public policy is more eﬀective for firms in Cat 3 as
compared to Cat 2. Thus, we conclude that average levels or growth rates of private
R&D expenditure (for the period 1997-2005) are not significantly diﬀerent between
categories associated with firms in the last two terciles, confirming partially the
absence of an additionality eﬀect characterizing the short-run view.
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6 Discussion and Conclusions
This paper introduces and discusses new perspectives in the evaluation of the public
funding to R&D, extending current studies in this field to include an intra-group
assessment of the outcome of these policies. Unlike an inter-group analysis directed
to investigate a diﬀerentiated impact of R&D grants across diﬀerently funded firms,
an intra-group analysis investigates the implications of the current modulation
of public intervention for similarly funded firms. Implemented by means of a
continuous treatment evaluation method, it allows us to investigate the likelihood
of crowding-in and crowding-out eﬀects within each tercile along the distribution
of the public R&D support grant.
The inter-tercile comparison is also presented aside using the categorical match-
ing method.
Both methods are coupled with the DiD approach to account for unobserved
heterogeneity and result strengthened by a rich data set featuring comprehensive
information on the pre-treatment variables.
Our results show that a notable substitution between private and public funds
occurs for a high level of the public subsidy. Firms in the third tercile do not out-
perform those in second tercile. The substitution becomes more apparent when we
analyze the intra-tercile distribution of public funds: we highlight a considerable
reduction in growth of private R&D expenditure among the top beneficiary com-
panies. Specifically, it emerges - on average - that funded firms receiving subsidies
up to DKK 8,2 million exhibit a low private contribution with respect to their
counterfactual units.
Overall these results indicate that an ex-post evaluation of the targets of a R&D
policy is desirable, if not necessary in time of downturns. In fact, if R&D funding
has to become a valid policy instrument to support companies hardly hit by a crisis
and facing financial restrictions, it is inevitable that public resources should not be
redirected away from risky and promising long-term research projects toward the
20
big players who would perform equally well without these funding.
The continuous treatment evaluation design presented in this paper is a general
methodology which can be fruitfully applied to assess other similar public policies
or other sources of R&D support, especially in contexts where the modulation
of the public intervention is of great interest. Indeed, generally R&D grants are
nowadays not from a unique source, but rather from a complex system of sources
ranging from private venture capitalists, to public venture companies and min-
isterial, national or supra-national innovation funds. We can therefore conceive
that this method could be successfully applied to future research to investigate the
relative eﬀectiveness of each type of financing source in promoting R&D research.
Unfortunately, we have to refrain from exploring this promising avenue on our data
for objective observational limits of our data set, even if the current survey on in-
novation comprises information - although incomplete - on the types of financing
received by each company.
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Variable Descrip,on Obs Mean Std.	  dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std.	  dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std.	  dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std.	  dev. Min Max
gr_privR&Dexp growth	  of	  private	  R&D	  expediture 12566 0.019 0.897 -­‐5.915 6.647 147 0.137 1.204 -­‐3.352 2.802 147 0.291 1.169 -­‐2.020 4.517 147 0.117 1.363 -­‐3.955 4.633
ln_privR&Dexp log	  private	  R&D	  expediture 12566 0.175 0.939 -­‐4.711 7.610 147 0.573 1.828 -­‐4.200 5.753 147 1.976 2.066 -­‐3.381 6.424 147 2.846 1.185 -­‐1.309 7.731
ln_loan log	  amount	  of	  loans 12566 3.929 1.531 -­‐0.001 11.278 147 4.661 1.500 1.310 7.943 147 5.559 1.787 0.229 9.707 147 5.818 1.971 0.474 9.012
ln_totassets_va log	  (total	  assets/value	  added)	   12566 0.498 0.692 -­‐2.018 8.104 147 0.705 0.618 -­‐0.656 2.236 147 0.685 0.701 -­‐0.643 2.761 147 0.694 1.084 -­‐0.883 5.033
R&D_int R&D	  expenditure/sales 12566 0.071 1.006 0.000 0.853 147 0.056 0.126 0.000 0.774 147 0.484 1.580 0.000 1.685 147 0.283 0.632 0.000 3.093
Pfun_dep public	  funding/private	  R&D	   12566 0.007 0.115 0.000 0.736 147 0.167 0.741 0.000 2.267 147 0.151 0.393 0.000 2.364 147 0.472 1.198 0.000 8.133
exp_int exports/sales 12566 0.329 0.350 0.000 1.000 147 0.652 0.314 0.000 1.000 147 0.553 0.327 0.000 1.000 147 0.460 0.351 0.000 1.000
copat co-­‐paten,ng	  dummy	   12566 0.002 0.047 0.000 1.000 147 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 147 0.020 0.141 0.000 1.000 147 0.090 0.288 0.000 1.000
newentr ﬁrm	  established	  less	  than	  3	  years	  ago 12566 0.016 0.125 0.000 1.000 147 0.020 0.140 0.000 1.000 147 0.040 0.196 0.000 1.000 147 0.017 0.129 0.000 1.000
sh_voc share	  of	  voca,onal	  workers 12566 0.153 0.131 0.000 1.000 147 0.183 0.128 0.018 0.600 147 0.239 0.160 0.041 0.625 147 0.269 0.125 0.000 1.000
sh_hskill share	  of	  highly	  educated	  workers 12566 0.073 0.127 0.000 1.000 147 0.104 0.153 0.000 0.800 147 0.146 0.161 0.000 0.646 147 0.226 0.177 0.000 1.000
foreing	   foreign	  ownership	  dummy 12566 0.001 0.031 0.000 1.000 147 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 147 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 147 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R&D_d R&D	  department	  dummy 12566 0.226 0.418 0.000 1.000 147 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 147 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 147 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
size_1_9 size	  dummy	  (1-­‐9	  employees) 12566 0.113 0.317 0.000 1.000 147 0.014 0.116 0.000 1.000 147 0.034 0.182 0.000 1.000 147 0.014 0.116 0.000 1.000
size_10_19 size	  dummy	  (10-­‐19	  employees) 12566 0.180 0.384 0.000 1.000 147 0.054 0.228 0.000 1.000 147 0.095 0.295 0.000 1.000 147 0.048 0.214 0.000 1.000
size_20_49 size	  dummy	  (20-­‐49	  employees) 12566 0.235 0.424 0.000 1.000 147 0.211 0.409 0.000 1.000 147 0.116 0.321 0.000 1.000 147 0.122 0.329 0.000 1.000
size_50_99 size	  dummy	  (50-­‐99	  employees) 12566 0.162 0.369 0.000 1.000 147 0.163 0.371 0.000 1.000 147 0.082 0.275 0.000 1.000 147 0.116 0.321 0.000 1.000
size_100 size	  dummy	  (more	  than	  99	  employees) 12566 0.334 0.472 0.000 1.000 147 0.558 0.498 0.000 1.000 147 0.673 0.471 0.000 1.000 147 0.701 0.460 0.000 1.000
y1 year	  1997 12566 0.132 0.339 0.000 1.000 147 0.191 0.394 0.000 1.000 147 0.231 0.423 0.000 1.000 147 0.156 0.365 0.000 1.000
y2 year	  1999 12566 0.258 0.437 0.000 1.000 147 0.054 0.228 0.000 1.000 147 0.327 0.471 0.000 1.000 147 0.408 0.493 0.000 1.000
y3 year	  2001 12566 0.199 0.399 0.000 1.000 147 0.204 0.404 0.000 1.000 147 0.211 0.409 0.000 1.000 147 0.143 0.351 0.000 1.000
y4 year	  2003 12566 0.206 0.405 0.000 1.000 147 0.238 0.427 0.000 1.000 147 0.143 0.351 0.000 1.000 147 0.184 0.389 0.000 1.000
y5 year	  2005 12566 0.204 0.403 0.000 1.000 147 0.279 0.450 0.000 1.000 147 0.088 0.285 0.000 1.000 147 0.109 0.313 0.000 1.000
ind1 Business	  services 12566 0.201 0.401 0.000 1.000 147 0.177 0.383 0.000 1.000 147 0.245 0.431 0.000 1.000 147 0.340 0.475 0.000 1.000
ind2 Chemical	  products 12566 0.021 0.144 0.000 1.000 147 0.061 0.241 0.000 1.000 147 0.061 0.241 0.000 1.000 147 0.048 0.214 0.000 1.000
ind3 Construc,on 12566 0.039 0.194 0.000 1.000 147 0.007 0.082 0.000 1.000 147 0.007 0.082 0.000 1.000 147 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ind4 Financial	  Services 12566 0.001 0.027 0.000 1.000 147 0.007 0.082 0.000 1.000 147 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 147 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ind5 Food,	  beverages	  and	  tobacco 12566 0.045 0.207 0.000 1.000 147 0.095 0.295 0.000 1.000 147 0.088 0.285 0.000 1.000 147 0.082 0.275 0.000 1.000
ind6 Hotels	  &	  Restaurants 12566 0.000 0.018 0.000 1.000 147 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 147 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 147 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ind7 Leather	  products 12566 0.002 0.039 0.000 1.000 147 0.014 0.116 0.000 1.000 147 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 147 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ind8 Machinery	  &	  equipments 12566 0.233 0.423 0.000 1.000 147 0.272 0.447 0.000 1.000 147 0.354 0.480 0.000 1.000 147 0.252 0.435 0.000 1.000
ind9 Metal	  products 12566 0.085 0.279 0.000 1.000 147 0.109 0.313 0.000 1.000 147 0.027 0.163 0.000 1.000 147 0.014 0.116 0.000 1.000
ind10 Mineral	  products 12566 0.021 0.143 0.000 1.000 147 0.020 0.142 0.000 1.000 147 0.014 0.116 0.000 1.000 147 0.027 0.163 0.000 1.000
ind11 Paper	  products 12566 0.058 0.234 0.000 1.000 147 0.020 0.142 0.000 1.000 147 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 147 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ind12 Petroleum	  products 12566 0.000 0.020 0.000 1.000 147 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 147 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 147 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ind13 Plas,c	  products 12566 0.028 0.165 0.000 1.000 147 0.068 0.253 0.000 1.000 147 0.082 0.275 0.000 1.000 147 0.014 0.116 0.000 1.000
ind14 R&D	  services 12566 0.009 0.093 0.000 1.000 147 0.014 0.116 0.000 1.000 147 0.082 0.275 0.000 1.000 147 0.163 0.371 0.000 1.000
ind15 Tex,le	  products 12566 0.021 0.145 0.000 1.000 147 0.020 0.142 0.000 1.000 147 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 147 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
ind16 Transports 12566 0.040 0.196 0.000 1.000 147 0.014 0.116 0.000 1.000 147 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 147 0.020 0.142 0.000 1.000
ind17 Wholesale	  trade 12566 0.174 0.379 0.000 1.000 147 0.095 0.295 0.000 1.000 147 0.007 0.082 0.000 1.000 147 0.041 0.199 0.000 1.000
ind18 Wood	  products 12566 0.022 0.147 0.000 1.000 147 0.007 0.082 0.000 1.000 147 0.020 0.142 0.000 1.000 147 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
The	  ﬁrst	  two	  rows	  in	  the	  list	  refer	  to	  dependent	  and	  contemporaneous	  variables,	  the	  others	  refer	  to	  values	  before	  treatment	  occurs.
Cat	  1	  :	  ﬁrst	  tercile	  of	  ﬁnanced	  ﬁrms	   Cat	  2	  :	  second	  tercile	  of	  ﬁnanced	  ﬁrms	   Cat	  3	  :	  third	  tercile	  of	  ﬁnanced	  ﬁrmsCat	  0	  :	  not	  ﬁnanced	  ﬁrms	  
Table	  1:	  Descrip/ve	  Sta/s/cs
Treated	   Controls ATT Std.	  Dev t-­‐stat ATT Std.	  Dev t-­‐stat
Cat	  1-­‐3 Cat	  0 0.653 0.258 2.531 0.282 0.156 1.808
Cat	  1 Cat	  0 0.056 0.377 0.149 0.090 0.245 0.367
Cat	  2 Cat	  0 1.018 0.373 2.729 0.542 0.303 1.789
Cat	  3 Cat	  0 1.148 0.424 2.708 0.130 0.163 0.798
Cat	  2 Cat	  1 1.108 0.591 1.875 0.686 0.359 1.911
Cat	  3 Cat	  1 0.870 0.732 1.189 0.072 0.300 0.240
Cat	  3 Cat	  2 0.180 0.487 0.370 -­‐0.316 0.324 -­‐0.975
Treated	   Controls ATT Std.	  Dev t-­‐stat ATT Std.	  Dev t-­‐stat
Cat	  1-­‐3 Cat	  0 0.076 0.445 0.171 0.295 0.288 1.024
Cat	  1 Cat	  0 0.054 0.346 0.156 -­‐0.098 0.414 -­‐0.237
Cat	  2 Cat	  0 0.629 0.392 1.605 0.299 0.416 0.719
Cat	  3 Cat	  0 1.271 0.971 1.309 1.287 0.607 2.120
Cat	  2 Cat	  1 0.745 1.057 0.705 0.028 0.489 0.057
Cat	  3 Cat	  1 1.282 1.555 0.824 1.039 0.603 1.723
Cat	  3 Cat	  2 0.308 1.032 0.298 -­‐0.167 0.337 -­‐0.496
Table	  2	  -­‐	  	  	  Categorical	  Matching
Log-­‐level	  of	  	  private	  R&D	  expenditure	  
Log-­‐level	  of	  	  private	  R&D	  expenditure	   	  Growth	  of	  private	  R&D	  expenditure	  
Table	  3	  -­‐	  	  	  Categorical	  Matching	  -­‐	  Medium-­‐run
Compared	  categories
Compared	  categories
	  Growth	  of	  private	  R&D	  expenditure	  
Cat Public	  funding	   Change	  in	  private	  R&D	   Std.	  Dev. t_stat Change	  in	  private	  R&D	  growth	   Std.	  Dev. t_stat
1 223.130 0.0067 0.0046 1.459 0.0039 0.0021 1.832
1 246.597 0.0070 0.0044 1.581 0.0038 0.0021 1.828
2 272.532 0.0071 0.0042 1.711 0.0037 0.0020 1.804
2 301.194 0.0073 0.0039 1.851 0.0035 0.0020 1.765
2 332.871 0.0074 0.0037 2.002 0.0033 0.0019 1.719
2 367.879 0.0075 0.0034 2.166 0.0031 0.0019 1.673
2 406.570 0.0076 0.0032 2.342 0.0029 0.0018 1.632
2 449.329 0.0076 0.0030 2.527 0.0027 0.0017 1.593
2 496.585 0.0077 0.0029 2.706 0.0025 0.0016 1.551
2 548.812 0.0079 0.0028 2.857 0.0023 0.0015 1.497
2 606.531 0.0080 0.0027 2.956 0.0021 0.0015 1.423
2 670.320 0.0081 0.0027 2.987 0.0019 0.0014 1.332
2 740.818 0.0083 0.0028 2.954 0.0017 0.0014 1.233
2 818.731 0.0084 0.0029 2.877 0.0016 0.0014 1.134
2 904.837 0.0085 0.0030 2.783 0.0014 0.0014 1.035
2 1000.000 0.0085 0.0032 2.693 0.0013 0.0014 0.931
2 1105.171 0.0084 0.0032 2.614 0.0011 0.0013 0.812
2 1221.403 0.0083 0.0033 2.544 0.0009 0.0013 0.671
2 1349.859 0.0080 0.0033 2.458 0.0007 0.0014 0.513
3 1491.825 0.0077 0.0033 2.324 0.0005 0.0014 0.346
3 1648.721 0.0072 0.0034 2.115 0.0003 0.0015 0.182
3 1822.119 0.0066 0.0036 1.841 0.0000 0.0016 0.027
3 2013.753 0.0060 0.0039 1.544 -­‐0.0002 0.0017 -­‐0.113
3 2225.541 0.0054 0.0042 1.269 -­‐0.0004 0.0018 -­‐0.232
3 2459.603 0.0047 0.0045 1.036 -­‐0.0006 0.0020 -­‐0.329
3 2718.282 0.0040 0.0047 0.846 -­‐0.0009 0.0021 -­‐0.408
3 3004.166 0.0033 0.0048 0.692 -­‐0.0010 0.0022 -­‐0.478
3 3320.117 0.0027 0.0048 0.562 -­‐0.0012 0.0022 -­‐0.547
3 3669.296 0.0021 0.0047 0.446 -­‐0.0014 0.0022 -­‐0.624
3 4055.200 0.0015 0.0045 0.337 -­‐0.0015 0.0021 -­‐0.717
3 4481.689 0.0010 0.0044 0.226 -­‐0.0016 0.0020 -­‐0.829
3 4953.033 0.0005 0.0042 0.109 -­‐0.0018 0.0018 -­‐0.962
3 5473.948 -­‐0.0001 0.0041 -­‐0.017 -­‐0.0019 0.0017 -­‐1.111
3 6049.647 -­‐0.0006 0.0040 -­‐0.152 -­‐0.0020 0.0016 -­‐1.267
3 6685.894 -­‐0.0012 0.0039 -­‐0.294 -­‐0.0022 0.0015 -­‐1.415
3 7389.056 -­‐0.0017 0.0039 -­‐0.443 -­‐0.0024 0.0015 -­‐1.551
3 8166.169 -­‐0.0024 0.0040 -­‐0.593 -­‐0.0025 0.0015 -­‐1.674
3 9025.014 -­‐0.0030 0.0041 -­‐0.743 -­‐0.0027 0.0015 -­‐1.787
3 9974.182 -­‐0.0037 0.0042 -­‐0.889 -­‐0.0030 0.0016 -­‐1.892
3 11023.177 -­‐0.0044 0.0043 -­‐1.027 -­‐0.0032 0.0016 -­‐1.989
3 12182.494 -­‐0.0052 0.0045 -­‐1.158 -­‐0.0034 0.0017 -­‐2.076
3 13463.737 -­‐0.0060 0.0047 -­‐1.279 -­‐0.0037 0.0017 -­‐2.153
3 14879.732 -­‐0.0068 0.0049 -­‐1.391 -­‐0.0040 0.0018 -­‐2.217
3 16444.646 -­‐0.0076 0.0051 -­‐1.491 -­‐0.0042 0.0019 -­‐2.269
3 18174.147 -­‐0.0084 0.0053 -­‐1.578 -­‐0.0045 0.0020 -­‐2.309
3 20085.537 -­‐0.0093 0.0056 -­‐1.649 -­‐0.0048 0.0020 -­‐2.336
3 22197.949 -­‐0.0101 0.0059 -­‐1.703 -­‐0.0051 0.0022 -­‐2.352
3 24532.531 -­‐0.0109 0.0063 -­‐1.739 -­‐0.0054 0.0023 -­‐2.359
3 27112.638 -­‐0.0118 0.0067 -­‐1.761 -­‐0.0057 0.0024 -­‐2.358
3 29964.103 -­‐0.0127 0.0072 -­‐1.770 -­‐0.0060 0.0025 -­‐2.350
Public	  funding	  is	  in	  1000	  DKK.
Standard	  errors	  are	  computed	  by	  bootstrapping	  (1000	  repeEEons).
Table	  4	  -­‐	  Con,nuous	  Treatment	  Matching	  Evalua,on
Change	  in	  public	  funding	  amount	  about	  1%
Cat Public	  funding	   Change	  in	  private	  R&D	   Std.	  Dev. t_stat Change	  in	  private	  R&D	  growth	   Std.	  Dev. t_stat Change	  in	  private	  R&D	   Std.	  Dev. t_stat Change	  in	  private	  R&D	  growth	   Std.	  Dev. t_stat
1 223.130 0.0403 0.0326 1.238 0.0225 0.0201 1.118 0.0812 0.0654 1.242 0.0445 0.0402 1.1055
1 246.597 0.0415 0.0309 1.341 0.0215 0.0197 1.093 0.0834 0.0628 1.329 0.0425 0.0388 1.0940
2 272.532 0.0424 0.0291 1.461 0.0204 0.0191 1.070 0.0853 0.0598 1.426 0.0403 0.0372 1.0818
2 301.194 0.0433 0.0270 1.603 0.0192 0.0183 1.052 0.0869 0.0565 1.537 0.0379 0.0354 1.0693
2 332.871 0.0439 0.0248 1.771 0.0180 0.0173 1.041 0.0881 0.0528 1.668 0.0354 0.0335 1.0560
2 367.879 0.0444 0.0226 1.966 0.0167 0.0162 1.035 0.0891 0.0488 1.824 0.0328 0.0315 1.0406
2 406.570 0.0448 0.0205 2.185 0.0154 0.0150 1.033 0.0897 0.0447 2.007 0.0303 0.0296 1.0219
2 449.329 0.0450 0.0186 2.415 0.0142 0.0138 1.031 0.0901 0.0407 2.213 0.0278 0.0279 0.9992
2 496.585 0.0451 0.0171 2.635 0.0131 0.0128 1.023 0.0903 0.0372 2.426 0.0256 0.0263 0.9727
2 548.812 0.0452 0.0160 2.820 0.0120 0.0120 1.002 0.0903 0.0345 2.617 0.0236 0.0250 0.9436
2 606.531 0.0451 0.0153 2.948 0.0112 0.0116 0.964 0.0901 0.0327 2.759 0.0220 0.0240 0.9141
2 670.320 0.0450 0.0149 3.011 0.0105 0.0115 0.913 0.0898 0.0316 2.842 0.0206 0.0233 0.8868
2 740.818 0.0447 0.0148 3.018 0.0099 0.0115 0.859 0.0893 0.0310 2.884 0.0195 0.0227 0.8624
2 818.731 0.0443 0.0148 2.986 0.0094 0.0116 0.810 0.0885 0.0305 2.900 0.0186 0.0222 0.8377
2 904.837 0.0438 0.0150 2.927 0.0090 0.0117 0.765 0.0873 0.0302 2.889 0.0177 0.0220 0.8045
2 1000.000 0.0431 0.0151 2.846 0.0084 0.0117 0.720 0.0857 0.0303 2.828 0.0166 0.0220 0.7518
2 1105.171 0.0421 0.0154 2.736 0.0078 0.0117 0.662 0.0836 0.0311 2.689 0.0151 0.0225 0.6719
2 1221.403 0.0408 0.0158 2.588 0.0069 0.0118 0.581 0.0809 0.0327 2.472 0.0132 0.0234 0.5634
2 1349.859 0.0392 0.0164 2.391 0.0057 0.0121 0.468 0.0775 0.0352 2.204 0.0106 0.0246 0.4304
3 1491.825 0.0373 0.0173 2.148 0.0041 0.0126 0.326 0.0734 0.0382 1.923 0.0073 0.0261 0.2786
3 1648.721 0.0349 0.0186 1.874 0.0021 0.0132 0.161 0.0686 0.0415 1.654 0.0031 0.0276 0.1134
3 1822.119 0.0323 0.0203 1.594 -­‐0.0002 0.0140 -­‐0.016 0.0631 0.0449 1.406 -­‐0.0018 0.0293 -­‐0.0605
3 2013.753 0.0293 0.0221 1.328 -­‐0.0030 0.0149 -­‐0.199 0.0570 0.0482 1.182 -­‐0.0074 0.0310 -­‐0.2387
3 2225.541 0.0260 0.0239 1.088 -­‐0.0060 0.0157 -­‐0.382 0.0503 0.0514 0.980 -­‐0.0136 0.0326 -­‐0.4182
3 2459.603 0.0225 0.0257 0.877 -­‐0.0093 0.0166 -­‐0.561 0.0433 0.0542 0.798 -­‐0.0204 0.0341 -­‐0.5976
3 2718.282 0.0189 0.0272 0.693 -­‐0.0128 0.0174 -­‐0.736 0.0358 0.0565 0.634 -­‐0.0274 0.0353 -­‐0.7766
3 3004.166 0.0150 0.0283 0.531 -­‐0.0164 0.0182 -­‐0.905 0.0281 0.0582 0.483 -­‐0.0347 0.0363 -­‐0.9553
3 3320.117 0.0111 0.0290 0.383 -­‐0.0201 0.0188 -­‐1.072 0.0203 0.0592 0.342 -­‐0.0421 0.0371 -­‐1.1334
3 3669.296 0.0072 0.0292 0.245 -­‐0.0238 0.0192 -­‐1.239 0.0123 0.0594 0.207 -­‐0.0495 0.0377 -­‐1.3108
3 4055.200 0.0032 0.0291 0.109 -­‐0.0275 0.0195 -­‐1.411 0.0043 0.0590 0.074 -­‐0.0567 0.0381 -­‐1.4878
3 4481.689 -­‐0.0008 0.0287 -­‐0.028 -­‐0.0310 0.0195 -­‐1.591 -­‐0.0036 0.0581 -­‐0.062 -­‐0.0638 0.0383 -­‐1.6659
3 4953.033 -­‐0.0048 0.0282 -­‐0.170 -­‐0.0345 0.0194 -­‐1.781 -­‐0.0116 0.0568 -­‐0.203 -­‐0.0706 0.0382 -­‐1.8473
3 5473.948 -­‐0.0087 0.0277 -­‐0.315 -­‐0.0378 0.0191 -­‐1.978 -­‐0.0195 0.0554 -­‐0.351 -­‐0.0772 0.0380 -­‐2.0335
3 6049.647 -­‐0.0127 0.0273 -­‐0.465 -­‐0.0410 0.0188 -­‐2.176 -­‐0.0273 0.0541 -­‐0.505 -­‐0.0836 0.0376 -­‐2.2237
3 6685.894 -­‐0.0166 0.0269 -­‐0.617 -­‐0.0441 0.0186 -­‐2.368 -­‐0.0352 0.0532 -­‐0.661 -­‐0.0897 0.0371 -­‐2.4140
3 7389.056 -­‐0.0205 0.0267 -­‐0.771 -­‐0.0470 0.0185 -­‐2.545 -­‐0.0431 0.0528 -­‐0.816 -­‐0.0955 0.0368 -­‐2.5972
3 8166.169 -­‐0.0245 0.0265 -­‐0.926 -­‐0.0499 0.0184 -­‐2.704 -­‐0.0510 0.0528 -­‐0.966 -­‐0.1011 0.0366 -­‐2.7659
3 9025.014 -­‐0.0285 0.0264 -­‐1.081 -­‐0.0526 0.0185 -­‐2.843 -­‐0.0590 0.0531 -­‐1.111 -­‐0.1065 0.0365 -­‐2.9153
3 9974.182 -­‐0.0326 0.0263 -­‐1.236 -­‐0.0552 0.0186 -­‐2.965 -­‐0.0672 0.0537 -­‐1.251 -­‐0.1118 0.0367 -­‐3.0451
3 11023.177 -­‐0.0367 0.0264 -­‐1.390 -­‐0.0578 0.0188 -­‐3.072 -­‐0.0754 0.0543 -­‐1.389 -­‐0.1168 0.0370 -­‐3.1588
3 12182.494 -­‐0.0409 0.0265 -­‐1.541 -­‐0.0603 0.0190 -­‐3.167 -­‐0.0838 0.0549 -­‐1.527 -­‐0.1218 0.0373 -­‐3.2609
3 13463.737 -­‐0.0451 0.0267 -­‐1.693 -­‐0.0627 0.0193 -­‐3.254 -­‐0.0924 0.0555 -­‐1.666 -­‐0.1265 0.0377 -­‐3.3546
3 14879.732 -­‐0.0494 0.0268 -­‐1.845 -­‐0.0650 0.0195 -­‐3.333 -­‐0.1011 0.0559 -­‐1.807 -­‐0.1310 0.0381 -­‐3.4408
3 16444.646 -­‐0.0538 0.0269 -­‐1.998 -­‐0.0671 0.0197 -­‐3.402 -­‐0.1098 0.0564 -­‐1.948 -­‐0.1353 0.0385 -­‐3.5176
3 18174.147 -­‐0.0582 0.0271 -­‐2.148 -­‐0.0692 0.0200 -­‐3.460 -­‐0.1187 0.0568 -­‐2.089 -­‐0.1392 0.0389 -­‐3.5810
3 20085.537 -­‐0.0626 0.0273 -­‐2.292 -­‐0.0710 0.0203 -­‐3.501 -­‐0.1275 0.0573 -­‐2.225 -­‐0.1428 0.0394 -­‐3.6264
3 22197.949 -­‐0.0670 0.0277 -­‐2.421 -­‐0.0726 0.0206 -­‐3.519 -­‐0.1363 0.0579 -­‐2.352 -­‐0.1459 0.0400 -­‐3.6484
3 24532.531 -­‐0.0714 0.0282 -­‐2.530 -­‐0.0740 0.0211 -­‐3.510 -­‐0.1450 0.0589 -­‐2.463 -­‐0.1486 0.0408 -­‐3.6431
3 27112.638 -­‐0.0757 0.0290 -­‐2.614 -­‐0.0751 0.0216 -­‐3.472 -­‐0.1536 0.0602 -­‐2.551 -­‐0.1507 0.0418 -­‐3.6082
3 29964.103 -­‐0.0800 0.0300 -­‐2.671 -­‐0.0760 0.0223 -­‐3.404 -­‐0.1621 0.0620 -­‐2.613 -­‐0.1524 0.0430 -­‐3.5442
Public	  funding	  is	  in	  1000	  DKK.
Standard	  errors	  are	  computed	  by	  bootstrapping	  (1000	  repeEEons).
Change	  in	  public	  funding	  amount	  about	  5% Change	  in	  public	  funding	  amount	  about	  10%
Table	  5:	  Robustness	  Checks
Con3nuous	  Treatment	  Matching	  Evalua3on	  with	  Diﬀerent	  Treatment	  Doses
